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Conclusion –Where to now? 
 
Richard Robison, Wil Hout, Caroline Hughes, Jane Hutchison, Ian Wilson 
 
 
Where to Now?  
While the DOC initiative appeared to signal a new era in development policy thinking, 
translating an understanding of political economy into practical policy has proven difficult, as 
we note in chapter three. As Sue Unsworth argues, the World Bank’s strategy for 
engagement on governance and corruption, for example (World Bank 2007), “ … contains no 
diagnosis of the underlying causes of weak governance, and hence no recognition of the scale 
of the challenges or the processes involved in creating more effective public authority” 
(Unsworth 2009:  885) . As we shall argue, the Bank has continued to regard insights into 
politics as essentially a means to better target institutional incentives and achieve behavioural 
change in key groups. Nor has the analysis of politics transformed the broad approach of 
DFID. Unsworth also notes that the British Government’s White Paper (DFID 2006), 
advances a “ … technocratic and largely conventional agenda for enhancing growth and 
improving basic services, with barely a nod in the direction of politics.” ((Unsworth 2009:  
889). On the one hand, it is true to say that recognition that politics is important has not led to 
new ways of understanding the problems of development so much as to new means of 
making old paradigms work better. At the same time, there have been important efforts, 
especially in the research agencies of development banks and organisations to grapple 
seriously with the problem of translating knowledge into practice.  
 
Models for the way forward 
One way out of the dilemma is simply to attempt to ignore or override the problem of 
politics. A second path has seen policy-makers seriously address the issue.   
 
Forget engagement with politics.  
1. The Neo-Conservative Solution: creative destruction 
Perhaps the most important and dramatic revision of existing strategies of influencing change 
was that initiated by neo-conservatives in the Bush Presidency. They clearly recognised the 
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limits to protecting markets by supporting dubious regimes and enforcing change through 
institutional reform and took the view that market-based reforms at both the economic and 
political level require nothing less than the elimination of entrenched ruling groups and their 
entire edifice of institutions and authority, if necessary by pre-emptive military strikes (see 
Mallaby 2002; Cooper 2002). The case of Iraq represents the quintessential insight into this 
thinking where the destruction of the Baathist government and its political apparatus created 
a seeming tabula rasa into which market-based economic policies could be introduced at will 
by the Head of the Coalition Provisional Authority, L. Paul Bremer. These policies included 
provisions that are the dreams of neo-liberal reformers even within the established heartlands 
of market orthodoxy, among them a flat tax-rate of fifteen percent grafted onto plans for 
extensive institutional reform in the bureaucracy and in the political sphere, including a 
framework of democratic institutions (Peck 2004: 392; Tabb 2006). It seemed that nothing 
could go wrong. 
 
There are obvious reasons why the neo-conservative solution of enforced development by 
means of war has its limits. But the neo-conservative experiment has some important 
political economy lessons. It has shown that the elimination of specific regimes is not in itself 
enough to guarantee the effective implementation and embedding of the sort of market and 
institutional reforms envisaged by neo-liberal reformers. What is missing in this prescription 
is a cohesive political force able to mobilise substantial social support on behalf of a wider 
programme for the reordering of power and the reconstruction of institutions towards a 
market society. Here, the neo-liberal and neo-conservative reformers confront serious 
dilemmas. The genuinely progressive forces that might be able to drive reform are usually the 
very ‘distributional coalitions’ that act on behalf of collective social demands in welfare, 
human rights or environmental reform and critics of the market and the interests it often 
supports. In any case, progressive middle class movements and social democratic or liberal 
political parties, from Mossadeq in Iran in the 1950s, have often already been eliminated or 
weakened by entrenched regimes. At the same time, the cliques of businessmen and 
politicians that have often been favoured as the political spearhead of reform in post-crisis 
societies are invariably without any serious social base or political support. The disastrous 
experiment with the disgraced businessman, Chalabi and his colleagues in Iraq is only one of 
many similar examples (Khalaf and Fidler, 2002). More recently, the attachment to 
Mohamed Kharzai in Afghanistan continues the tradition.  
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2. The Millennium Challenge Account: Pre-emptive Selectivity 
By contrast, the central approach of the Millennium Challenge Account proposed to 
overcome indifference or resistance by self-interested elites to ‘good governance’ and ‘good 
policy’ by simply excluding countries from development assistance where specified 
institutional and policy frameworks were not already in place. The selectivity approach of the 
MCA seemed simple enough: US development assistance would only be made available to 
countries where elites had the political will and capacity to put in place specified institutional 
and policy reforms that supported markets. For  Chhotray and Hulme, ‘MCA thus, is a tool 
for “pre-emptive” development, which does the reverse of imposing conditionalities, that is, 
it withholds funds until all demands for meeting neo-liberal goals (promoting economic 
freedom and the rest) are met, largely through quantitative forms of measurement’ (Chhotray 
and Hulme 2009: 39-40).  However, as Hout (this volume) points out, there are real limits to 
simply withdrawing from support of various regimes even where they are serial exponents of 
corrupt and repressive forms of rule. The threat of spreading disorder and the abandonment 
of populations to accelerating poverty as well as potentially disturbing the geo-political order 
inhibit governments and aid agencies in the West from declaring governance and institutional 
programmes defunct (Holman 2006).  
 
3. Making do with what is there: supping with the devil 
It is clear that the benign liberal evolution expected by many in the West has not taken place. 
As we have seen in chapter two, in Africa, highly predatory and repressive regimes survive 
even in the ongoing condition of chronic economic decay and spreading poverty. In Asia, 
even the shocks of the Asian Economic Crisis and the efforts by the World Bank and the IMF 
to impose reforms on beleaguered governments as they sought bailouts and rescues has failed 
to radically transform the governance and political regimes of the region. Even in Indonesia, 
where democratic transformation took place, the same oligarchies and power relations 
continue to prevail. In any case, such regimes are now protected from the kind of assaults on 
currencies that precipitated the Asian financial crisis in the late 1990s where they possess 
large foreign reserves and, increasingly, substantial sovereign funds able to influence 
investment decisions even in the West itself. What are the options for development 
reformers? One is to provide intensive inputs of development assistance and policy reform 
and let the by-products of institutional reforms and a progressive middle class hopefully take 
care of themselves. This is the thinking that underpinned the ‘shock therapy’ introduced into 
THE ELEPHANT IN THE ROOM: POLITICS AND THE DEVELOPMENT PROBLEM  
13 - 14 DECEMBER, 2010 
MURDOCH UNIVERSITY, PERTH 
 
137 
Eastern Europe, as we have seen. And it appears to inform much of the thinking behind the 
UN Millennium Project (Sachs 2005).    
 
For others, these regimes represent different and historically entrenched institutional 
pathways within which market capitalism itself must be accommodated (Zysman 1994). 
Some economists remain convinced that ‘good governance’ and efficient market institutions 
are not so essential to the consolidation of markets in the early stages at least (Rodrik 2003). 
There is some recognition that even neo-patrimonial forms of governance can possess utility 
in entrenching market economies in developing countries and even, ironically, in lubricating 
markets in the US itself (Brinkerhof and Goldstein 2005). And there is some acceptance of 
the idea that even the worst of regimes from the viewpoint of good governance and economic 
efficiency may indeed be highly functional, at least to the most powerful political and 
economic interests in the country and therefore derive considerable resilience from this 
(Chabal and Delos, 1999). Thus, development organisations have fluctuated between 
bypassing governments to deal with the grass roots via PRSPs and dealing directly with 
governments.  
 
Engage with the Problem of Politics 
a) The World Bank Agenda: Manipulating Politics by Building Better and Cleverer 
Institutions 
In the World Bank, the idea that development and markets themselves might be driven by 
conflicts over power and its distribution has been anathema in this beehive of rational choice 
approaches and methodological individualist assumptions. However, it has also been argued 
in the neo-liberal camp that pressure for reform might be applied on recalcitrant governments 
by civil societies within the developing countries themselves. There was no shortage of moral 
exhortation from within the neo-liberal camp for citizens to take the lead. There should be a, 
“better public understanding of the appropriate role of government” (Duncan and McLeod 
2007: 91), or more good-will or common sense that emphasised the critical role of leadership 
in persuading citizens and subjects to have ‘correct – that is, realistic and empirically-
grounded – beliefs and expectations’ and convincing officials to be honest and citizens to 
trust legal systems and governments (Levi 2006: 12). How would this happen? Are we 
talking about the old modernisation ideas where the West supplied modern culture, values 
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and norms? For the World Bank, such transformations could be achieved via good 
institutional design aimed at providing incentives and opportunities.  
 
Perhaps the most comprehensive attempt at political economy analysis by the World Bank 
has been that of Fritz, Kaiser and Levy (2009). In this study, the authors suggest ways that a 
study of political economy might enable more efficient design of institutions. The idea of 
political economy is focused around collections of individuals and organised groups such as 
the military, political parties, business associations or NGOs. These are divided into 
‘demand-side’ and ‘supply-side stakeholders’, or ‘reform champions and ‘reform opponents’ 
or winners, neutrals, and losers’ (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy (2009: 47). They act on behalf of 
multiple, shifting and overlapping interests. The problem is to design institutions that will 
motivate one party (agents) to act on behalf of another (principals), especially to enable 
citizens to motivate politicians to act in the collective interest rather than their own self-
interest or elected officials to motivate bureaucrats to implement policies and provide 
services (Fritz, Kaiser and Levy (2009: 51).  
 
Thus, institutions can be designed to influence the ‘gatekeepers’, ‘veto players’ and 
‘selectorates’ identified by political economy analysis in a kind of game theoretic exercise. In 
other words, this is an idea of political economy based on the presumption of voluntary 
exchanges between rational, utility-maximizing individuals and where there is no system of 
overarching power relations. It continues the basic principles of public choice political 
economy, urging only better institutional design through a more careful analysis of the 
agents, principals and other players in the game as we have noted in chapter four (see also 
World Bank 2003).  
 
In practical terms there are also advantages in trying to influence reform by means of 
institutional engineering and governance, social contracts and new forms of citizenship and 
participation. These avoid the difficulties of directly dealing with potentially incendiary 
issues of power, especially in cases where corruption, social injustice and repression are 
essential elements in the way political allies sustain their authority. The focus on social 
capital and partnerships expresses a pluralist construction of citizens’ demand making. For 
officials in development agencies, programmes of governance and institution building make 
it easy to allocate funds and report outcomes where these focus on the processes of design 
and delivery. Nor is it any exaggeration to say that a vast and growing army of consultants 
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have also been the beneficiaries of trends to outsource policy and devise and measure 
technical fixes to complex economic and social problems. Governance is a highly lucrative 
industry for them (Hamilton-Hart 2006).          
 
b) Is there a Future for the DOC?- attempts to address politics by directly engaging with 
elites and or civil society.  
i)  Incentives are advocated to support the DOC objectives although not in the way 
institutional engineering is used by the World Bank to change behaviour. Unsworth 
and other advocate ways where incentives can be applied by policy actions, including 
those between politicians and potential investors (Unsworth 2009 and Williams et al. 
2009). For example, Unsworth points to the way market leverage has been applied in 
the forestry sector in efforts to eliminate illegal logging and to support the rights of 
forest communities (Unsworth 2009: 888). Perhaps the most widely discussed 
incentives approach concerns the issue of taxation and the proposition that 
governments will be more accountable and responsive where they rely on domestic 
sources for their revenues rather than on windfalls from resources booms and foreign 
aid flows (see, Moore 2001, Moore and Unsworth 2006). Progressive withdrawal from 
aid in favour of targeted assistance in building tax collecting capacity would constitute 
potentially important incentives. Of course, the question here is the extent to which 
those who can be forced into paying tax have the power to influence the government 
and whether the increasing number of governments, especially those in in Africa, that 
now have access to resource rents, would be interested in developing domestic 
revenues.  
ii) David Booth and colleagues have sought to extend the DOC framework through 
‘[a]ssessment of the room to manoeuvre or scope for different outcomes created by 
dynamic aspects of the change process’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: v).  
Influenced by the work of Merilee Grindle, they point to the’ need to devote deliberate 
attention to the otherwise unexplained scope for change ‘against the odds’ and to the 
factors that operate within that space’ (Booth and Golooba-Mutebi 2009: v)i.   
iii) The Leadership Program explores ‘the role of human agency – specifically leadership, 
elites and coalitions – in the process of institution and state building’ (Land 2010: 1). 
Critically, these are to be ‘understood politically’ (de Ver 2008: 1). The Leaders, Elites 
& Coalitions Research Programme (LECRP) has sought to understand the role of 
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leadership in ‘shaping institutions, state building and development outcomes’ 
(Leftwich 2009: 1). Commenced in 2007, the first phase of the program to mid-2009 
was housed within the World Bank, but since then it has been under the wing of 
AusAID. Intending to focus attention on agency and strategy, the concern is with 
leadership as political processes in particular contexts, rather than with the traits or 
behaviours of particular individuals as leaders (ibid). In this sense therefore, leadership 
is not treated ‘as a free-standing virtue’ but as involving the establishment and 
maintenance of coalitions and institutions for particular collective purposes (Leftwich 
2009: 7). However, as applied to advancing donors’ agendas’ it is inevitable that 
“development” is understood in ‘intentional’ terms, as an outcome of political decision 
making if not exactly planning. It is more possible to talk of development in these 
terms if we focus on the outcomes from particular projects or even programs of donors, 
it becomes less possible when we look at development as a process of structural 
transformation.  Viewed in this second way, there are clearly larger questions about the 
nature of development to be answered. 
iv) ‘Building demand from below’. The question is how to put pressure on elites to adopt 
specific reform agendas, including governance reforms. This involves, ‘ … increasing 
the ability of citizens to participate in decisions that affect their lives, to influence how 
development challenges are met and to hold governments or other institutions to 
account.’ (AUSAID 2007a: 1). The idea is generally that this can be done by means of 
institutional reform, including opening opportunities for greater participation and 
accountability in governance (World Bank, see also OECD DAC 2005: 35).   
 
Within the OECD there have been suggestion of direct involvement in strengthening ‘change 
agents’ within the government, civil society, bureaucracy or academia – in other words, 
western-oriented middle classes and business – that may support technocrats (Development 
Assistance Committee 2001: 12). At another level, development agencies began to address 
more direct ways of cultivating and strengthening reform-minded organisations and interests 
as potential partners in reform coalitions. This often meant little more than greater 
collaboration between aid agencies and NGOs and increased flow of aid funds to the latter. 
But there have also been more ambitious ideas for achieving a broader mobilisation and 
organisation of potential reformist allies. In part these were aimed at providing citizens with, 
‘ … information about how government works, what to expect, and how to hold governments 
accountable.’ (AUSAID 2007a: 2). Elsewhere, more direct engagement is proposed, both 
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with institutions that mediate state-society relationships – parliaments and electoral systems – 
and to support and strengthen civil society organisations, including churches, the media, 
research organisations and ‘reform agents’ within both the public and private sectors 
(AUSAID 2007a: 4).   
 
Lessons from Structural Political Economy: Implications from the Case Studies 
 
Given the above attempts to better engage with politics, what is the niche or gap that our 
studies fill? 
At a general level, structural approaches to political economy raise the question of whether 
policy-makers are at the mercy of the structural constraints and processes involved in the 
construction of social power and state authority. Is there any room for intervention that can 
change things? Obviously there are. Some institutional reforms have an important impact 
because they satisfy a preference for reform that has political weight. Economic crises or the 
sudden injection of huge amounts of money into an economy, for example, have the potential 
to change things and disrupt the existing organisation of power and influence in society and 
politics. The point is whether this is going to weaken predatory regimes and strengthen 
reformist coalitions and what control is exerted by outside forces over the direction of 
change? Are attempts to support change agents going to be successful, even where they take 
into account reform leaders need coalitions and organisations to support them (Leftwitch 
2009). The important point is that these are political questions. It is important to ask why 
reformist sympathisers have not already seized and exerted power and why specific regimes 
remain entrenched even in cases where they preside over unhappy populations and derelict 
economies. In some cases, attempts to bring (the right sort of) agency back into the equation 
will fail. Elsewhere they may be more realistic. Structural political economy provides the 
tools to assess this in a way that no other political economy does.   
 
At a more practical level, while it is true that structural understandings of power and society 
point to the limits of policy and institutional fixes for complex problems and suggest that 
there are preconditions for reform that are often beyond the control of development agencies 
and donor countries, one negative benefit of this approach is knowing what not to do. This 
can be more important than appears. For example, an appreciation of structural political 
economy will make it fairly easy to predict where the disbursement of funds or use of 
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property rights – including over land and forestry – as a means of solving various 
development problems will simply be expropriated to concentrate inequalities and support 
vested interests. In these cases a decision not to proceed can be the best one. Or highly 
engineered processes for the allocation and operation of these rights may be designed.  
Some of the more specific conclusions form the case studies are as follows:  
1)   we consider how ‘donors can better know how their programs are interpreted by 
recipients, how this affects their alliances (or not) and, accordingly, how formal and 
informal shifts in alliances can strengthen or weaken different ideological perspectives, 
over short and long terms’ (Hughes and Hutchison, this volume). This is done also with 
an understanding of change dynamics.  
2)   we focus on issues around donors’ engagement with civil society actors. One point 
arising is that if donors are to be more politically engaged then they will need to give 
ground on their own agendas and recognise the ways in which development objectives 
are framed differently on the ground, often as a result of particular enduring struggles.  
 
The Cambodian Case 
The Demand For Good Governance programme in Cambodia represents a good example of a 
programme designed to meet the needs of donor politics rather than tailored to fit the needs 
of the target country. The programme served a number of purposes for the World Bank, 
including a concern to bolster the Bank’s reputation amongst Cambodian NGOs which had 
vocally criticised the Bank’s land, forestry and demobilization programmes; and a concern to 
promote the DFGG model which had been successfully deployed elsewhere.  Consequently 
reservations expressed by staff members with local knowledge were overridden in the 
concern to get the programme off the ground.  The significance of these kinds of imperatives 
are widely recognised within the aid industry, but until now they have not been factored into 
political economy analyses in a sophisticated way. 
 
Just as aid organisations design aid programmes with regard to unstated as well as stated 
goals, so too do local partners participate in them on the same basis.  Our model of dedicated 
and tactical alliances suggests an initial vocabulary for distinguishing between different types 
of reformer, based upon whether their goals are primarily about the nature of reform itself, or 
about the building of political alliances.  Recognition that investment in tactically useful 
relationships may be a goal in itself represents a recognition that alliances for reform are 
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continually negotiated and renegotiated and that this in itself requires deployment of 
resources and effort on the part of all development partners. 
 
Recognition, not only that a tactical element exists for all organizations and actors involved 
in aid programming, but that this tactical element is a significant and important part of the 
development process, represents a starting point for moving away for a model of ‘success’ 
and ‘failure’ in terms of stated development outcomes, and towards a model of engagement 
that regards the maintenance of political alliances as useful in itself.  However, the analysis 
we present also warns against regarding such political alliances as a vehicle for achieving 
reform in the short term.  As the US experience in promoting the Clean Hands Campaign in 
Phnom Penh shows, simply backing a weak alliance against a powerful elite with a strong 
interest in preventing certain types of reform can be counter-productive. 
 
The Cambodian experience across a range of fields of development programming suggests 
that international interventions are continually turned to the advantage of a predatory elite in 
its apparently unstoppable consolidation of power.  A structuralist analysis suggests that 
fundamental change is in any case only possible in times of crisis, when the investment in 
particular alliances and the propagation of particular ideas can suddenly provide an 
opportunity to influence events.  This implies that development agencies dealing with 
governance need to rethink their understanding of reform: genuine reform can only occur 
when ruling elites are severely weakened and seeking new ways of boosting legitimacy, or 
when new social forces are contending with established political alliances for power.  
Consequently, institutional reforms, of the kind that governance programmes have focused 
upon, are inevitably going to be either blocked or co-opted unless they are promoted in times 
of crisis. Structuralist approaches thus locate change within time frames that are far longer 
than most donor programmes will admit.  Attempts to wedge political economy analyses into 
short time frames, that align with the budgetary cycles and staff deployment cycles of donor 
agencies, have entailed a superficial engagement with the idea of structural change. Taking 
political economy seriously requires recognising that the short term reform efforts that 
characterise most donor programmes are contained within the contingencies of political 
negotiations between interested alliances of actors, rather than transforming these.  The 
Cambodia case described here shows how reform programmes can be established with the 
mutual agreement of a variety of partners, despite lack of agreement on the desirability of 
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change.  For the Ministry of Interior it represents a way of enlisting the World Bank and 
NGOs in the delicate business of supervising newly elected subnational councils with newly 
devolved powers, and ensuring that the process of de-concentration of power not only 
effectively mobilizes the voters to greater election winning effect, but does not upset the 
hierarchies of loyalty and patronage that characterise Cambodian People’s Party Control.  For 
NGOs it represents a way of networking internationally with social accountability groups and 
developing a relationship with a powerful donor that could help them in the future.  Even for 
the local World Bank office, there is doubt over the achievability of the programme’s reform 
goals, but awareness that the programme could help the Bank build better relations with 
NGOs who have been critical of the Bank’s past interventions in forestry and land titling. 
Temporary and tactical motives – an interest in new modes of political mobilization on the 
part of the Cambodian government; a concern to invest in relations with the World Bank on 
the part of NGOs – can allow a programme to get off the ground with no real belief or 
intention that its reform goals will be met. 
 
Moreover, taking structuralist analysis seriously suggests that the instutionalisation of reform 
processes cannot of its self generate progressive outcomes, since the functioning of 
institutions is determined by political struggles within society.  From a structuralist 
perspective, therefore, it is unsurprising that donor programmes of institution building are 
harnessed by existing or rising elites, rather than unseating them.  World Bank programmes 
targeting natural resource distribution in Cambodia offer a good example of this.  Forestry 
programmes intended to ensure good governance of natural resources were far less important 
in determining distributions of wealth from forest resources than the fact of the integration of 
Cambodia into regional and global timber markets.  Once the latter was accomplished, elites 
within Cambodia competed for control of the profits from these, and used those profits to 
further strengthen their position within the political regime.  A similar phenomenon was 
observable in the land sector.  A World Bank programme designed to provide equal access to 
land titles for rich and poor was undermined by the impossibility of the programme’s 
institutions operating impartially in areas such as the capital city where land values were very 
high and the target of elite struggles.  The World Bank decided to avoid implementing its 
project in these areas, and attracted significant criticism from NGOs representing evicted 
families, who pointed out in failing to tackle that section of the poor most at risk of 
dispossession, the Bank’s programme resembled the emperor with no clothes. 
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In the short term, donor agencies are better advised to focus not on achieving fundamental 
transformations in the nature of power, but in understanding and developing a language for 
discussing it with local actors.  Taking this approach suggests that the DFGG programme will 
be of greatest use, both to the Bank, would-be reformers in the Ministry of Interior, and the 
NGOs that have trained through the PECSA programme, if its goals remain, in fact, rather 
vague, and if the focus of the programme is upon developing relationships rather than 
achieving particular results. 
 
The need to develop a common language for discussing questions of governance is pressing.  
As the DFGG programme shows, mistranslations or the transposition of donor terminology 
into quite different ideological frameworks can significantly change the import of reform 
programmes.  The DFGG programme also shows how such mistranslations can be 
convenient to aid agencies whose ulterior motive is not reform per se but the building of new 
relationships.  The DFGG programme, and the case of Cambodia more generally, also 
demonstrates how time consuming and expensive, in terms of resources, the doublespeak 
associated with governance reform can be.  Both government and NGOs in Cambodia devote 
considerable time and resources to developing cadres of officials who have the language 
skills and training to be able to converse and report in a language that is familiar and 
convenient for donors.  However, there is little evidence that either government or NGOs 
have developed a capacity to translate this meaningfully into a conversation with the 
Cambodian population.  On the contrary, the narrative of reform and development which 
Cambodian government officials and NGO workers use in their relations with poor villagers 
connects poorly, if at all, with the narrative that is sustained in Phnom Penh when conversing 
with donors.  This puts a great deal of pressure on individuals caught in the middle, in trying 
to maintain a coherent sense of their own role.  It also has the effect of professionalising 
reform activists and distancing them from the average citizen, an effect that has been noted in 
a number of studies of the NGO-ization of social movements emerging in the fields of fishery 
and land disputes in Cambodia. 
 
Analysis of the DFGG programme illustrates two aspects of this.  The first relates to the 
relationship between donors and government.  The analysis presented here suggests that the 
agreement between the World Bank and the Ministry of Interior on the establishment of the 
programme rests upon a mutually convenient mistranslation of its aims.  For the Ministry of 
Conclusion –Where to now? 
146 
Interior, reform is focused upon mobilizing wider participation and using NGOs and villagers 
trained in social accountability techniques as a means to manage a complex and politically 
risky process of deconcentration of state power away from central ministries to provincial 
and district levels.  Contrary to liberal assumptions, all available evidence suggests that the 
Ministry of Interior conceptualises this as reform designed to renew and further strengthen 
the legitimacy of CPP dominance, rather than as a way of opening up political competition 
within local government.  This embeds a particular model of development which is in many 
ways antithetical to either liberal politics or liberal economics, as described in chapter x 
above. 
 
Given the trajectory of Cambodia’s development since 1979, and the lack of success of 
Western donors in imposing liberal models via funding for armed insurgency in the 1980s, a 
complex peace-keeping operation in the early 1990s, and subsequent efforts at statebuilding 
and support for civil society, it is unrealistic to expect that these attitudes within the Ministry 
of Interior could possibly be reformed via manipulation of aid mechanisms. The way in 
which Cambodia has integrated into the regional and global economy since the early 1990s 
has strengthened, rather than weakening, these tendencies in Cambodian politics.  Donors are 
increasingly recognising this: the implication is that engagement in governance in Cambodia 
implies relinquishing the rather hopeless goal of achieving reform within a time frame of a 
few years, and investing instead in developing a body of knowledge about the nature of the 
Cambodian government.  Agencies such as the World Bank tend to be staffed by a mixture of 
career officials from head office, who move from country to country and do not build up a 
body of local knowledge; contract staff employed for their country expertise, but in 
subordinate and temporary positions; and local staff, who are usually selected for their 
knowledge of international development models.  This hierarchy entails that much World 
Bank programming entails eliciting such information about the local context as is necessary 
to facilitate the roll-out of international programmes, rather than using local knowledge to set 
the agenda for reform.     
   
Shifting emphasis away from returns on the aid dollar and towards a ‘knowledge’ model 
where aid agencies build up specialist country teams and develop country-specific 
vocabularies for engaging in negotiations on the nature of reform and development would 
appear to be a prerequisite for an approach informed by political economy.  This implies 
openness on the part of aid agencies to not only the conceptualization of reform, but also the 
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operational hierarchies within agencies, and the nature of the aid bureaucrat’s career and 
function.  Replacing the generalist familiar with standardized templates for aid programming 
with a specialist prepared to learn local languages and spend years in-country establishing 
relationships with local political players is a prerequisite for an approach that puts politics at 
the centre of development.  Such an approach could give substance to the claims of 
‘partnership’ that are currently popular in development thinking.  Our analysis suggests 
further that taking this approach seriously requires some political commitment to particular 
social forces or alliances.  The technocratic approach has allowed avoidance of such political 
commitments on the basis that certain policies are objectively correct, regardless of who 
implements them.  The political economy approach suggests that relationships be elevated 
over policies, and that local knowledge and priorities be allowed to influence aid 
programming: this implies a shift to a solidarity model of decision-making for aid agencies, a 
principled commitment to support for particular groups and for the preservation of particular 
types of political space in which local political struggles can play out, even in situations 
where it is acknowledged that such an approach is unlikely to result in short term ‘success’ in 
achieving reform. 
 
Where to on slums in Metro Manila?  
The case study of the ADB’s slum eradication program in Metro Manila shows how attempts 
to “incentivise” public officials to undertake pro-poor reforms will prove inadequate if they 
do not directly address how these officials interpret what is proposed and how this connects 
to their structural interests and alliances. The program’s incentives assume that LGUs are 
predisposed to meet their service obligations, so long as they are provided with appropriate 
know-how and resources. But, as the study shows, local government officials have rather 
different visions and plans for urban development and socialised housing. Nevertheless, 
slums are not merely a physical consequence of material poverty. They are in fact the 
product of social and political relationships that – especially in a capital city like Metro 
Manila – extend from local to national levels, through linkages variously created by 
institutional requirements, electoral cycles, ideological commitments, and/or collective 
organising. These relationships have reproduced inequalities, but as well, under certain 
conditions, they have delivered concessions to the urban poor  – occasionally in the form of 
national programs, legislation and new modes of representation (Hutchison 2007), but more 
often more through site-specific political deals and/or standoffs.  
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There are three points worth making about concessions. One is that they are forced and 
therefore require further pressure and effort to secure implementation and compliance. 
Another is that concessions are as much directed at placating and/or containing pro-poor 
protest as they are at delivering on the substance of pro-poor demands. Finally, because 
concessions are forced they do not come at any time, they are generally linked to other 
pressures or openings in prevailing power relationships which are created by (to cite some 
examples) electoral conditions, infrastructure developments, donor funding and/or supportive 
alliances.  
 
One urban poor activist suggests that the ADB should be looking to ‘do deals with the 
mayors’ because this is ‘the only way to get them on side’ (Interview 2006). Critically, deals 
are not incentives. The incentives approach seeks behavioural change so it has to hope that 
opponents’ motivations and interests are essentially malleable. By contrast, the move to 
make deals accepts that interests are relatively enduring and not likely to change; 
nevertheless, deals are possible if opposing sides have appropriate bargaining strengths. 
(Concessions tend to follow when inequalities are greater.) In other words, from deals it is 
possible to achieve “tactical” rather than “dedicated” support for reform. They do not deliver 
a fundamental change in power relations, but do provide a way to negotiate politically. It is 
not clear what deals international donors might be actually willing and able to make, but it 
most likely they will need to be coordinated between donors, in the case of slums, perhaps 
through the Cities Alliance. That said, it is unlikely that deals can be done without further 
domestic political pressures.  
 
What are the prospects for building a reform constituency among Metro Manila’s urban 
poor? If the reform is the ADB program itself, the answer is ‘little’. This is because, despite 
the program embodying real attempts to ensure compliance with legislation that was an 
outcome of urban poor advocacy, it is clear there is little or no effective “demand from 
below” for it in its present form. This is not because the urban poor’s shelter needs are not 
great; instead it is that that there just has not been the support forthcoming for the ADB’s 
proposed solutions. The informal settler communities targeted early in the program have 
declined to sign up to the shelter arrangements on offer because they consider them to be 
unaffordable. On the whole, communities have demonstrated greater support for measures to 
increase land tenure security, without the inclusion of purpose-built housing. For one, a 
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concern about purpose-build housing is that it is too inflexible because it is not possible to 
build-on to accommodate additional family members and/or renters. More particularly, there 
is often significant reluctance to taking on (more) debt. Widely couched negatively, as the 
urban poor thus seeking to avoid their responsibilities, this reluctance can also be seen to 
indicate household preferences for a range of shelter and livelihood strategies – a number of 
which neo-liberal efforts to bring poor households into formal land and financial markets 
will foreclose.  
 
This is not to say that the mobilisation of pro-poor forces should be constrained by the 
present, but it does indicate where their priorities lie. The point is that urban poor protest is 
neither as continuous nor as formally organised around a city-scale set of demands as 
international donors’ might prefer. On top of this, the politics of Metro Manila’s slums is 
quite complex. There are identifiable individuals, organisations and alliances with histories 
of urban poor activism – and associated victories – but these do not cover the sum total of 
urban poor political engagement. It is worth pointing out, however, that urban poor protest is 
generally not particularly driven by ideology, at least not in the sense of adherence to defined 
manifestos or parties. Critics have portrayed the urban poor consequently as ‘political 
clients’, but it is important to stress this misconstrues the nature and form of their demand-
making – both the extent to which it is oriented to real outcomes and is far more 
confrontational than patron-client models portray. On the whole, urban poor NGOs 
themselves are “pragmatists” rather than “idealists” – that is they have long term goals of 
social transformation but also regard short term gains as significant (see Hughes and 
Hutchison, this volume). This means that they are open to engagement with international 
donors, although not always in ways that donors have previously tried. For example, NGOs 
have sought alliances with more powerful others – for example the Catholic Church – at least 
partly to provide a greater level of  protection from harassment and violence.  
If donors are to seek to engage with “demands from below” they will need to do so from the 
vantage point of  how power works on the ground. The “power cube” approach is one. To 
quote Gaventa: ‘In this approach, I argued, power must be understood in relation to how 
spaces for engagement are created, the levels of power (from local to global), as well as 
different forms of power across them. By applying such analysis, I argued, we could begin to 
assess the possibilities of transformative action in new democratic spaces, and how 
transformative possibilities of citizen action might be enlarged.’ (Gaventa 2005: 6):  
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Attention to the spaces – ‘opportunities, moments and channels’ (Gaventa 2005: 11) – for 
change suggest a way forward that incorporates structural political economy, more than a 
focus on the agents of change.  
 
The Urban Informal Sector in Jakarta, Indonesia. 
 Centeno and Portes have argued that “the relationship between the state and civil society 
defines the character of informality and this relationship is in constant flux”, adding “the 
changing geometry of formal/informal economic activities follows the contours delineated 
by past history and the character of state authority” (Centeno and Portes 2006: 32).  
Applying this proposition to the case of the urban informal sector in Jakarta, the hostile 
approach adopted by the Jakarta administration suggests that authoritarian and centralist 
tendencies remain well entrenched, despite the introduction of minimal participatory 
channels and informal recognition of the sectors importance to the economic and social 
wellbeing of the city. The protection racket type mentality institutionalized during the New 
Order still prevails, which sees the informal sector as economic transactions ‘where the state 
neither provides protection nor receives a cut’, making conflict all but inevitable. At the 
same time the regulatory capacity of the state is limited: it is neither able to exert a monopoly 
over territory by effectively controlling the presence of the UIS, ameliorate the conditions 
producing its expansion nor, when intent is present, regulate and mediate the interests of 
private capital by shaping the direction of urban development in ways accommodative of 
UIS activity and the poor more generally.  
 
One fundamental problem that continues to inhibit the development of effective management 
and incorporation of the UIS in Jakarta is the persistence amongst political elites of static 
ideas regarding urban development itself. From Sukarno’s vision of Jakarta as a ‘city of 
greatness’ to former governor Ali Sadikin’s notion of a ‘modern metropolis’ devoid of “non 
modern elements” such as becak rickshaws and Sutiyoso’s Singapore inspired 
criminalization of ‘disorderly’ street life, successive political leaders have remained fixated 
upon what Kusno refers to as ‘nationalist urbanism’. Jakarta, as the nation’s capital, must be 
seen to reflect national prestige and state power through appropriate forms of ‘modern 
development’, discipline and order, despite this being seemingly at odds with the social and 
economic needs and realities of a large percentage of the city’s population. The result has 
been the emergence of two faces to Jakarta: relatively spacious arterial roads lined with 
luxury hotels, high-rise office buildings, shopping malls and elevated highways 
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(infrastructure reflective of the dominant class) which masks, displaces or simply passes over 
crowded shanty towns, poor kampung and traffic jammed side streets and alleyways, with 
the boundaries and spaces of intersection between the two a constantly shifting zone of 
conflict and contestation between state and society. As Rukmana has argued, “many of the 
problems associated with the informal sector are not attributes inherent to the informal sector 
but manifestations of unresponsive urban planning itself”. In this particular image of Jakarta 
as a modern and orderly city the UIS have no legitimate place, out of place elements 
constituting an eyesore unbefitting a modern capital, the urban street transformed into a site 
of disturbance, disorder and criminality in the face of an ideal type ‘development’ 
increasingly shaped by the consumption patterns and lifestyle preferences of a growing upper 
middle-class. While faced with a very different socio-political environment to that of Ali 
Sadikin, including the Asian Economic Crisis induced ‘forced entrepreneurship’ of tens of 
thousands of Jakarta residents, including many from the middle-class, post New Order 
governors Sutiyoso and Fauzi Bowo have nonetheless continued his uncompromising 
approach in relation to the UIS despite holding, in principle, the legally mandated authority 
(such as via Regional Regulation No.5 1978) to designate it legitimate space in which to 
operate. More recently increasing public debate and frustration over the seemingly 
unsustainable nature of Jakarta’s current development trajectories has led not to a 
fundamental rethink at top levels as to how better manage and govern urban space, but rather 
an ‘escape plan’ entailing moving the nation’s capital elsewhere. These entrenched 
conceptualizations of the image of the city and its future development cannot be divorced 
from the particular configurations of interests that benefit from them. With a surplus of high-
end department stores, shopping malls and luxury housing, Jakarta has reached a virtual 
saturation point of development shaped by the interests of private developers, property 
moguls and political elites, with the ever increasing numbers of UIS workers literally 
cramming into the cracks and shadows between these mega-projects.  
 
Where to from here: recommendations  
With these obstacles and constraints in mind, the following are a number of practical, 
strategic and conceptual recommendations that can be potentially considered by government, 
donors and civil society stakeholders to tackle some of the issues identified: 
 
For government and donors: 
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1. The establishment of an Office of Street Traders Affairs (DINAS PKL) within the 
Jakarta administration whose central task is the development of strategies for finding 
equitable/integrative solutions for accommodating UIS workers. In order to be 
effective such an agency needs to cooperate closely with other relevant government 
bodies, such as Office of regional Planning and Development (Bappeda) and Satpol 
PP. The case of Solo offers an example of a successful precedent. A parliamentary 
commission into the UIS must also be a top priority.  
2. It is crucial that the UIS is given a greater level of official and legal recognition as the 
statistically predominant economic sector from which Jakarta residents (also 
nationally) make a livelihood, including its importance to the stability of the formal 
sector. It is necessary for the administration and donors to re-think predominant 
conceptualizations of the UIS, and the nature of ‘urban development’ more broadly, 
embracing the sector as a productive and dynamic one rather than as a social problem 
or a ‘formal sector in waiting’.  
3. Greater enforcement of existing regulations which are accommodative of the UIS is 
required together tighter regulating of future development.  Considering the huge drain 
on public resources created by its enforcement, a review of the socio-economic impact 
of the 2007 Public Order Law is required. This needs to be coupled with serious 
attempts to tackle corruption and abuses of power within enforcement and planning 
agencies, in particular the Satpol PP. The substantial financial resources allocated to 
Satpol PP could be reassigned to incentive and consultative based alternatives. This 
could include the creation of incentives for developers to incorporate space for the UIS.  
4. A focus upon integrative and inclusive approaches to planning i.e. specified operating 
hours, street side expansions and a revised concept of Green Zoning which integrates 
with existing residential zones and informal economic activity. To be sustainable those 
affected must be meaningfully involved in the planning process. In this respect the 
example of Solo again offers a potential model to be adapted to Jakarta’s particular 
conditions.  
5. Further revisions to the participatory mechanisms of the Musrenbang process in order 
to facilitate greater grassroots and community based input. In particular there needs to 
be a consideration of ways by which representative decision making power can be 
allocated to civil society participants and community stakeholders, such as is found in 
the Local development Councils model adopted in the Philippines.  
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6. Accommodation and integration of the UIS into city planning should be seen as an 
integral element of broader poverty reduction strategies.  
7. An expansion of ‘rural growth poles’ implemented by the national government, 
whereby jobs, housing and public services are provided in certain rural areas to reduce 
rates of rural-urban migration.  
 
For NGOs, advocacy and sectoral groups 
1. The dissemination of successful local strategies from fragments of activity into city wide 
strategic plans for more broad based lobbying of the Jakarta administration (and political 
parties and national government) via a coalition/strategic alliance of relevant NGOs and 
vendor associations, residents groups etc. Pressure needs to be applied to national 
government to turn informal acknowledgement of the UIS into concrete policy and action. 
2. A multi-level advocacy approach at the highest and lowest levels of government 
simultaneously. This is both a local and a national issue, which will only continue to 
increase in the future without suitable sustainable policies. 
3. Further engagement with existing participatory forums such as Musrenbang and local 




i Grindle (1991) observes that neoclassical political economy does not explain change and how it 
occurs, when it does. She recommends that we study “critical moments when change occurs, 
for such moments reveal essential political dynamics at work in a society” (Grindle, 1991: 63).  
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